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COURTING SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW IN
INDIA
Deepti Shenoy1
Learned men see with an equal eye
a scholarly and dignified priest,
a cow, an elephant, a dog,
and even an outcaste scavenger.2
1. INTRODUCTION
Inequality in India is made particularly pervasive by the fact that India’s rigid social
hierarchies are intertwined with longstanding quasi-religious principles.3 Notwithstanding the
fact that equality, based on the intrinsic divinity of all beings, is a principle inherent to
Hinduism,4 India has long been defined by a strict system of social stratification legitimated by
perceived cultural and religious principles.5
The hierarchies that define Indian society bear upon every aspect of life.6 In the realm of
employment, hierarchical norms define the types of occupations into which a person might enter,
as well as the conditions of employment she may expect to encounter.7 Many industries remain
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de facto segregated by caste and gender.8 Prejudice often operates at a surface level, and a certain
level of classification by social status is the norm rather than the exception.9
Since employment discrimination in India is primarily the result of structural inequalities
that assign a subordinate social status to women and disadvantaged minority groups, the problem
is best addressed through a systemic approach that attacks the underlying hierarchies directly. 10
A substantive conception of equality is enshrined in India’s constitution, which directs the state
to take affirmative action to empower women and disadvantaged minorities to compete on more
equal terms with members of more privileged social groups.11 The government has been guided
by this constitutionally sanctioned substantive impetus, and it has implemented a system of
“compensatory discrimination” in the form of quotas for women and members of disadvantaged
castes in government jobs.12 In taking a primarily substantive, rather than formal, approach to
equality, India rightly recognizes that neutral application of laws and policies will perpetuate the
subordination of already disadvantaged groups.13 Given the salience of social hierarchies in the
Indian context, disadvantaged minorities contend with near insurmountable barriers to availing
themselves of opportunity.
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CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. AND GLOBAL JUST. & HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 6, at 55; see also MEDIRATTA, supra
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Despite its commitment to substantive equality, however, India’s existing approach to
employment discrimination has fallen short of its egalitarian ideals.14 One explanation for this
shortfall is the lack of a comprehensive employment discrimination framework that adequately
addresses the myriad ways in which discrimination operates. The existing legal protections
against such discrimination include constitutional provisions mandating equality15 and a handful
of scattered criminal statutes. There is no umbrella employment discrimination statute to regulate
private sector workplaces in India.16 Reservations, which constitute the primary means by which
the government addresses employment discrimination, do not extend to the private or
agricultural sectors. This is highly problematic, given the fact that these sectors together
encompass nearly eighty percent of the workforce.17 The existing statutory provisions provide
some measure of protection to women in the private sector workforce, but many of these
protections do not address discrimination on the basis of caste.
The social affliction engendered by entrenched hierarchies is exacerbated by the
hesitance of the legislative and executive branches of government to take action, beyond the
existing system of quotas, to benefit disadvantaged minorities.18 Compensatory discrimination
has become a highly politicized endeavor, with various political parties vying for the support of
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See Takahiro Ito, Caste Discrimination and Transaction Costs in the Labor Market: Evidence From Rural North
India, 88 JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 292, 299 (observing that India’s reservation-based approach to
employment discrimination has only had a limited impact). See also Sukhadeo Thorat & Paul Attewell, The Legacy
of Social Exclusion: A Correspondence Study of Job Discrimination in India, 42 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
WEEKLY 4141,4144 (highlighting the high incidence of caste discrimination in the relatively unregulated private
sector); Geeta Gandhi Kingdon & Jeemol Unni, Education and Women’s Labour Market Outcomes in India, 9
EDUCATION ECONOMICS 173, 194(2000)(“[W]omen suffer high levels of wage discrimination in the Indian urban
labour market…”).
15
INDIA CONST. art. 14, 15, 16.
16
See Anti-Discrimination/Sex Equality, LAWYERS COLLECTIVE, http://www.lawyerscollective.org/womens-rightsinitiative/anti-discriminationsex-equality.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2012) (“There is no comprehensive antidiscrimination code in India although there are laws that address specific aspects related to equality.”).
17
Narula, supra note 9, at 319.
18
Avani Mehta Sood, Gender Justice Through Public Interest Litigation: Case Studies From India, 41 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L. L. 833, 845 (2008).
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caste-based interest groups.19 In the process, influential members of nominally disadvantaged
groups are unfairly benefited and the interests of the genuinely underprivileged are neglected.20
The Indian Supreme Court has attempted to fill the void created by the legislature’s
abdication of responsibility.21 Since the late 1970s, the Court has adopted an increasingly activist
posture in an effort to uphold the rights of the disadvantaged.22 Despite the Court’s commitment
to substantive equality, however, it has not been wholly immune from the regressive, traditional
norms that pervade the rest of Indian society.23 The Court has also selectively superimposed
formal equality principles on a vision of substantive equality colored by traditional norms, an
approach that has at times yielded unsatisfactory results.24 The Court’s occasional reliance on
traditional stereotypes has sometimes had the effect of calcifying social hierarchies.25
While the entrenched hierarchies that undergird Indian society necessitate a substantive
approach to equality that takes into account the painfully real social differences that limit access
to opportunity for certain groups, India’s substantive approach has hitherto failed to generate the
anticipated results. The deficiencies in India’s approach to substantive equality are the lack of a
comprehensive framework addressing employment discrimination in its various forms and the
selective intermingling of formal and substantive equality with traditional norms. This article
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Pager, supra note 10, at 338.
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21
Sood, supra note 18, at 844.
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Id., at 837.
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See Jeremy Sarkin & Mark Koenig, Ending Caste Discrimination in India: Human Rights and the Responsibility
to Protect (R2P) Individuals and Groups From Discrimination at the Domestic and International Levels, 41 GEO.
WASH. INT’L. L. REV. 541, 558-59 (2010) (describing the Indian Supreme Court’s reliance on traditional caste
identities in reaching certain of its judgments).
24
See, e.g., Javed v. State of Haryana, AIR 2003 S.C. 3057 (India) (upholding, on the basis that it was not “arbitrary,
unreasonable, or discriminatory,” a law that prevented men and women who had more than two children from
serving in municipal governments, despite clear evidence that this disproportionately burdened and disqualified
women); see also Sood, supra note 18, at 888 (quoting Supreme Court Justice Ruma Pal as observing, “[t]he most
frequent judicial failures to conceptualize the offence arise when the Court approaches the issue with certain judicial
predispositions, based on either class or gender”).
25
Kalpana Kannabiran, Judicial Meanderings in Patriarchal Thickets: Litigating Sex Discrimination in India, 44
REVIEW OF WOMEN’S STUDIES 88, 90 (2009).
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argues, therefore, that India’s commitment to equality in employment would be better realized
through (1) a comprehensive employment discrimination framework, which would ease the
litigation burden on disadvantaged victims, offer a wider range of remedies than those currently
available under the constitution and criminal laws, and extend the protections of employment
equality further than the limited sphere to which they currently apply and (2) a strong
commitment to a primarily substantive approach, disentangled from formal equality and free
from the regressive effects of traditional stereotypes.
2. HIERARCHIES
Perhaps the most visible of India’s social hierarchies, the caste system, divides Hindus
into four classes, called varnas: the Brahmins (priests), the Kshatriyas (warriors), the Vaishyas
(businesspeople), and the Shudras (laborers), in order of descending authority.26 Below the caste
system lies a fifth group, the Dalits, or scheduled castes, who have historically been subjugated
through their perceived untouchability, whereby contact with them has been viewed as
inauspicious and polluting.27 Within the larger varnas are various subcastes, or jatis, which vary
from one region to another and which have, over the course of time, dictated the occupations into
which a person might enter.28 The caste system is a complex social code, which, as per tradition,
governs all aspects of human interaction, with the upper castes exercising considerable
subjugating influence over the lower castes and those below the caste system.29 The almost total
absence of intermarriage across castes reinforces these social divisions.30 The system is one of
graded inequality, a factor that has significantly contributed to its continuing relevance because
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Sarkin & Koenig, supra note 23.
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28
Id.
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Priya Sridharan, Representations of Disadvantage: Evolving Definitions of Disadvantage in India’s Reservation
Policy and United States’ Affirmative Action Policy, 6 ASIAN L.J. 99, 102 (1999).
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Narula, supra note 9, at 277.
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of the incentive it provides at each level to maintain the status quo.31 Thus certain jatis among
the Dalits, for instance those involved in the practice of manual scavenging, or the cleaning of
dry latrines, are viewed as untouchables even among the Dalits.32
No less significant in Indian society is the hierarchy that separates men from women and
draws for legitimacy upon gendered cultural values purportedly rooted in religious doctrine.33
Traditional conceptions of women as being primarily suited to domestic roles have restricted the
roles that women, in particular those of the upper castes, have played in the public sphere.34
Women who enter the workforce have to overcome significant hurdles at every step of the way,
from contending with familial and societal expectations that they remain in the domestic sphere
to facing discrimination in all aspects of employment.35 Women of the lower castes are
particularly vulnerable due to their position at the intersection of caste and sex discrimination.36
These women account for the majority of those engaged in what are viewed as the most
dangerous and degrading occupations and face significant opposition to any attempts on their
part to empower themselves.37
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Id., at 260.
CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. AND GLOBAL JUST. & HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 6, at 56.
33
See A.P. THAKUR, SUNIL PANDEY & KAVITA KRISHNAMURTHI, 21ST CENTURY INDIA: VIEW AND VISION 132
(2009) (observing that, in the Indian social structure, “men outrank women of the same or similar age”). For an
example of the ways in which religious gender hierarchies bear upon the Indian system of laws, see Kamala
Sankaran, Special Provisions and Access to Socio-Economic Rights: Women and the Indian Constitution, 23 S. AFR.
J. HUM. RTS. 277, 285 (2007) (describing the practice on the part of the Courts of upholding sex discrimination that
falls under the purview of so-called religious personal laws).
34
Karin Kapadia, Translocal Modernities and Transformations of Gender and Caste, in THE VIOLENCE OF
DEVELOPMENT: THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY, GENDER AND SOCIAL INEQUALITIES IN INDIA 167 (2002); see also
Wendy Olsen & Smita Mehta, Female Labour Participation in Rural and Urban India: Does Housewives’ Work
Count?, 93 RADSTATS J. (2006) (underscoring the perceived desirability of the status of a housewife in areas of the
country significantly influenced by Hindu Brahminical norms, particularly in rural households where women are
compelled of necessity to work outside the home).
35
ANIL DUTTA MISHRA, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF WORKING WOMEN IN URBAN INDIA 59 (1994).
36
See Narula, supra note 9, at 277-78 (noting that Dalit women are uniquely oppressed due to their vulnerability to
violence, their unequal access to services, employment opportunities, and education, and the fact that government
development programs tend to prioritize initiatives that benefit Dalit men).
37
Sesha Kethineni & Gayle Diane Humiston, Dalits, the “Oppressed People” of India: How are Their Social,
Economic, and Human Rights Addressed?, 4 WAR CRIMES, GENOCIDE, & CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 99, 104-05
(2010); see also Shuriah Niazi, Madhya Pradesh’s Manual Scavengers Caste in a Trap, WOMEN’S FEATURE
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Inequality in India is particularly problematic because of the scale on which it occurs and
its tendency to dominate all aspects of people’s lives.38 As Smita Narula notes, “India is an
example of injustice in the extreme: the numbers affected are greater, the poverty is deeper, the
atrocities are an every day affair, and enforced servitude and segregation is the norm.” 39
Pervasive de facto occupational segregation creates immediately apparent social division and
limits the ability of members of disadvantaged groups to better their social position. Due to
intensely discriminatory attitudes on the part of employers, skewed distribution of resources, and
historical patterns of disadvantage, Dalits and the so-called backward classes (certain of the
extremely disadvantaged Shudra subcastes) and women are often relegated to menial and/or
undesirable areas of employment.40 The ingrained structures of inequality that constitute the
framework of Indian society necessitate an approach to equality that takes into account the
insurmountable barriers that prevent certain sections of society from availing themselves of
opportunity.
3. INDIA’S APPROACH TO EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
The Indian government has primarily taken a substantive view of equality, with formal
equality principles selectively applied in certain cases.41 In line with this substantive emphasis,
the focus of the government’s efforts has been to compensate for and remedy existing social
hierarchies.42 Substantive equality recognizes the existence of social classifications, and seeks to
target those social structures that contribute to the subordination of historically disadvantaged

SERVICE, Jan. 5, 2009, available at http://www.newstrackindia.com/newsdetails/64125 (describing the occupation of
manual scavenging, or the cleaning of non-flushing latrines, which has been outlawed in India but into which many
lower-caste and marginalized women are nevertheless compelled to enter).
38
Narula, supra note 9, at 260.
39
Id.
40
CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. AND GLOBAL JUST. & HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 6, at 55; MEDIRATTA, supra note 7, at,
17.
41
Chandola, supra note 11, at 110.
42
Sridharan, supra note 29, at 99-100.

7

groups.43 Formal equality, in contrast, overlooks social classifications and attempts to ensure
neutral application of laws and policies and non-discrimination among individuals.44 While
substantive equality, with its recognition of real social differences between groups, embraces
affirmative action in favor of disadvantaged groups as being in itself an essential part of equality,
formal equality views affirmative action as an exception to equality to be avoided if at all
possible.45
The Indian Constitution contains both formal and substantive equality provisions,
suggesting recognition on the part of the founders that uniformly applied formal equality would
perpetuate the existing structural inequalities.46 Although the Constitution mandates equality
under the laws and prescribes a merit-based regime of advancement in government employment,
it also expressly endorses a vision of substantive equality that is anchored in affirmative action to
empower minorities to compete on more equal terms with members of more privileged groups.47
That the state has embraced this constitutional directive is evident in the fact that the primary
approach the government has taken to eradicating employment discrimination is a system of
compensatory discrimination in the form of quotas.48 Under this system, 49.5 percent of
positions in higher education and government employment are reserved for members of the
scheduled and backward classes.49 The reservation system for women is less comprehensive, but
nevertheless sets aside one third of the seats in municipal (local) governments for female

43

Claire McHugh, The Equality Principle in E.U. Law: Taking a Human Rights Approach?, 14 IRISH STUDENT L.
REV. 31, 34 (2006).
44
See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 107 (1976)
(describing the formal-equality based antidiscrimination principle employed by the U.S. Courts in interpreting the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution as reflecting the idea that “similar things should be treated similarly”).
45
Jason Morgan-Foster, From Hutchins Hall to Hyderabad and Beyond: A Comparative Look at Affirmative Action
in Three Jurisdictions, 9 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 73, 81 (2003).
46
Chandola, supra note 11, at 110.
47
Sridharan, supra note 29, at 144.
48
Id., at 111-112.
49
Morgan-Foster, supra note 45, at 87.
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candidates.50 This approach is complemented by various other affirmative action provisions
implemented on a discretional basis by the state and central governments.51 Compensatory
discrimination is rooted in the belief that in the absence of strict quotas, minorities disadvantaged
due to rigid societal hierarchies will be denied access to gainful employment.52 There is also the
hope that the increased presence of members of disadvantaged groups in positions of power will
translate into more opportunities for members of these groups across the board.
In addition to the constitutional protections against employment discrimination, the
legislature has enacted a handful of statutes that address various aspects of discrimination in the
workplace. For the purposes of this analysis, the most significant of these statutes is the Equal
Remuneration Act of 1976, which guarantees women equal treatment relative to similarly
situated men in the workplace.53 The Equal Remuneration Act forbids discrimination in hiring,
pay and conditions of employment between male and female workers engaged in the same or
similar work, except where dissimilar treatment is mandated or permitted under the law.54

4. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM
Although India’s primarily substantive approach to equality in employment rightly
recognizes the potential for perpetuation of existing hierarchies in the absence of special
solicitude for the interests of the disadvantaged,55 the Indian approach has failed to generate the

50

Raghabendra Chattopadhyay & Esther Duflo, Women as Policy-Makers: Evidence From a Randomized Policy
Experiment in India, 72 ECONOMETRICA 1409, 14131 (2004).
51
MARC GALANTER, COMPETING EQUALITIES: LAW AND THE BACKWARD CLASSES OF INDIA 380 (1984).
52
See Prior, supra note 12, at 77-78 (“The [framers of India’s Constitution] believed that compensatory
discrimination in this field was both a method to strengthen India’s underprivileged and a means of preventing upper
classes from obstructing the admission of backward classes into government employment).
53
Equal Remuneration Act (Act No. 25/1976, amended by Act No. 49/1987) (India).
54
Id. Cf. Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1963) (forbidding discrimination in wages between men and women
engaged in similar work in regulated American workplaces).
55
Sandra Fredman, Facing the Future: Substantive Equality Under the Spotlight (Univ. Oxford Legal Research
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 57, 2010).
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anticipated results. The shortcomings of the Indian approach lie in (1) its limited reach, (2) the
near abdication of responsibility by the legislative branch of government, and (3) the judiciary’s
seemingly incoherent superimposition of formal equality principles on a vision of substantive
equality colored by regressive cultural norms.
4.1. The Lack of a Comprehensive Framework
The lack of a comprehensive legal framework to address employment discrimination in
its various forms imposes significant barriers to the realization of robust equality of employment
opportunity in India. India has thus far relied almost exclusively on its system of compensatory
discrimination to root out such inequality, and this approach has met with only moderate
success.56 A system grounded almost entirely on quotas is inherently limited because it
disregards the manifold ways in which discrimination and structural inequality may operate in
the workplace.57 So, for example, a quota system does not address disparities in wages,
promotion opportunities, and conditions of employment. The limitations of India’s reservationbased approach are compounded by the fact that reservations are primarily concentrated in
relatively undesirable areas of employment such as menial or janitorial work.58 In this manner,
members of disadvantaged groups remain segregated in areas of employment traditionally
associated with their castes.59 Instructive in this regard is the experience of nearly a hundred
Dalit workers in the city of Ahmedabad, who, despite having advanced degrees in a range of
subjects, could find only janitorial employment.60
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Sridharan, supra note 29, at 111-12.
See Ito, supra note 14, at 299 (underscoring the limitations of India’s reservation-based approach to employment
discrimination).
58
See CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. AND GLOBAL JUST. & HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 6, at 28 (noting that Dalits occupy
more than 65 percent of government sweeping positions and only 16.5 percent of non-sweeping positions).
59
Id.
60
Randeep Ramesh, Untouchables in New Battle for Jobs, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 2, 2004,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/oct/03/india.randeepramesh.
57
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In practice, reservations benefit less than one percent of the Dalit population.61 The
private and agricultural sectors, which together account for a huge percentage of the total market,
are outside the purview of reservations.62 The recent trend toward liberalization, with its
concomitant privatization of industries, has further limited the compensatory discrimination
system by taking these jobs out of the reach of reservations.63 Due to a range of factors including
resistance on the part of private employers and the informal working conditions prevalent in
agricultural work, these sectors have been left almost wholly unregulated.64 Although the Equal
Remuneration Act and a smattering of other legislation provide women in private sector
workplaces with some measure of protection from discrimination, members of the scheduled and
backward classes are excluded from many of these protections under the existing statutory
scheme.65 Discrimination outside the public sector is both blatant and rampant. To take one
example, Prakash Chauhan, who held a masters degree in Commerce, found his offer of
employment at an accounting firm rescinded upon the firm’s discovery that he was a Dalit.
Chauhan was ultimately forced to take up sweeping when he could find no other employment.66
Even for those nominally protected under the existing statutory scheme, effective
recourse has proven difficult or impossible to obtain.67 The Equal Remuneration Act is a

61

Narula, supra note 9, at 313.
Id., at 319. See also Thorat & Attewell, supra note 14, at 4144 (“(I)t appears that caste favouritism and the social
exclusion of dalits…have infused private enterprises even in the most dynamic modern sector of the Indian
economy). For the employment figures, see Employment in Public and Organised Private Sectors, RESERVE BANK
OF INDIA, available at http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationsView.aspx?id=13602 (last visited Jan. 12, 2012).
See also India Labour Market Report 2008, ADECCO INSTITUTE, available at
http://www.macroscan.org/anl/may09/anl110509Indian_Labour.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2012).
63
Id., at 318.
64
SMITHA RADHAKRISHNAN, APPROPRIATELY INDIAN: GENDER AND CULTURE IN A NEW TRANSNATIONAL CLASS 93
(2011).
65
See CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. AND GLOBAL JUST. & HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 6, at 26 (noting that India has failed
to provide Dalits with adequate protection against discrimination in employment).
66
Ramesh, supra note 60.
67
See Aditi Kavarana, Equal Remuneration Act 11 (Ctr. For Civil Soc’y, Working Paper No. 15, 2000), available at
http://economics--www.ccsindia.org/ccsindia/policy/rule/studies/wp0015.pdf (citing Assistant Labour
62
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criminal statute, which requires victims of employment discrimination to register complaints
with labor inspectors designated by the states.68 The criminal system is limited in its ability to
adequately address employment discrimination in its various forms.69 The penalties for violations
of employment statutes are relatively minimal, and suffer from chronic underenforcement.70 The
limited legal redress on offer disincentivizes complaints because victims have little to gain from
expensive and drawn-out litigation that gives them little in the way of compensatory damages.
Corruption is endemic, and labor inspectors tend to be overworked and underpaid.71 The interests
of marginalized groups are thus often neglected.
4.2.The Legislature’s Abdication of Responsibility
India’s approach to employment discrimination has also fallen short of its egalitarian
objectives because of the failure of the legislative branch of government to adequately fulfill its
part in implementing substantive equality.72 Political expediency tends to drive all legislative
decisions, and there is a perceived need on the part of legislators to appease vote banks.73 This
has produced hesitance on the part of legislative decision makers to champion controversial
initiatives to mitigate discrimination against minorities when these initiatives do not align with
the political interests of the decision makers.74 Thus, influential members of nominally
disadvantaged castes have been seen to benefit at the expense of the genuinely disadvantaged.75
The highly politicized system of compensatory discrimination provides one example of this. It
Commissioner K.R. Sawhney as noting that enforcement of the Equal Remuneration Act is accorded minimal
importance in Delhi).
68
Indira Hirway & Neha Shah, Labour and Employment Under Globalization: The Case of Gujarat, ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL WEEKLY, May 28, 2011, at 62.
69
Cf. Julie Suk, Procedural Path Dependence: Discrimination and the Civil-Criminal Divide, 85 Wash. U. L. Rev.
1315 (2008) (arguing that employment discrimination should be conceptualized as being neither civil nor criminal,
in order to overcome the limitations of each of these procedural paths).
70
Kavarana, supra note 67, at 10-11.
71
Id., at 10.
72
Sood, supra note 18, at 847-48
73
Pager, supra note 10, at 338.
74
Sarkin & Koenig, supra note 23, at 552.
75
Id., at 550.
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has been observed that new castes are continually added to the affirmative action rosters at the
behest of politicians eager to secure their interest with these groups, with little inquiry into their
backwardness or lack thereof.76 These castes, unlike the Dalits, vary widely in terms of their
social and economic backwardness, and many are in fact economically and politically
powerful.77 Few are ever removed from the reservation lists.78
The legislative branch has repeatedly reneged on its obligation to introduce legislation to
remedy the effects of discrimination on disadvantaged minorities. Although the need for an
umbrella employment statute has been increasingly stressed in recent years, no concrete action in
this direction has yet been taken.79 Nor has the legislature followed up on proposals to establish a
centralized agency to address discrimination in employment.80 Large gaps remain in the
employment discrimination framework, and there is little action taken to fill this void.
The legislature’s inadequate discharge of its responsibilities has forced the judiciary
branch of government to assume an increasingly activist position.81 One example of this activism
is the Court’s creation of so-called public interest litigation, a framework by which public
interest agencies and members of the public are empowered to litigate claims on behalf of

76

The Dalits, in contrast, tend to be almost uniformly marginalized. Reservations tend to dominate any discussion
on empowering Dalits, and other important considerations are inadequately explored. In this regard, commentator P.
Sainath has observed, “In the media, any debate on Dalit rights is about reservation, and not about water, health,
sanitation or land rights. In the minds of the media audience, we have created a stereotype that Dalit is equal to
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underprivileged victims of government discrimination and inaction.82 In Vishaka v. State of
Rajasthan, the Supreme Court of India filled a conspicuous void in employment discrimination
law by issuing a comprehensive set of sexual harassment guidelines binding on public as well as
private employers.83 The context in which these guidelines were issued was a case in which a
government employee was raped in retaliation for her work against rural child marriage.84 The
activist posture of the Court is underscored by the point that the facts of the case did not
implicate sexual harassment in private sector workplaces. In drafting these guidelines, the
Supreme Court pointed to the complete absence of legislation addressing the pervasive problem
of sexual harassment in the workplace.85 The Court acknowledged the shortcomings of a
judicially mandated sexual harassment framework, but maintained that the importance of the
issue necessitated extraordinary action.86 It stipulated that its guidelines would be binding only
until appropriate legislation was enacted to cap the shortfall.87 Legislative inaction has thus
created a situation in which the Supreme Court has had to assume an increasingly prominent role
in shaping employment discrimination policy.
4.3. The Supreme Court’s Intermingling of Formal and Substantive Equality
The effective implementation of substantive equality in the realm of employment has also
been hindered by the Supreme Court’s seemingly random intermingling of formal equality
principles with a substantive equality framework that has at times drawn upon regressive cultural
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norms.88 The Court’s embrace of a primarily substantive approach to equality is reflected in its
recognition of the differences between social groups.89 Thus the Court has repeatedly upheld the
validity of affirmative action schemes to benefit disadvantaged castes and women. The Court has
noted that a strictly neutral application of laws and policies, as required by formal equality, will
not meaningfully implement the guarantee of equality enshrined in the Constitution.90 Although
the Court has, on many occasions, appropriately recognized the disparities in social standing
among different groups, it has not uniformly applied these substantive equality principles in
cases involving extremely underprivileged parties.91 The Court has on occasion resorted to a
shortsighted, selective application of formal equality principles, and the incoherence of the
Court’s doctrine in this regard has yielded unsatisfactory results.
In Air India v. Nergesh Meerza, the Court was confronted with a discriminatory policy
that distinguished between the male and female members of the cabin crew of India’s biggest
airline. Air India established separate cadres, with separate terms of employment, for the male
assistant flight pursers and the female airhostesses.92 The two classes performed substantially
similar types of work.93 The policy at issue required airhostesses, but not assistant pursers, to quit
(1) upon marriage, if it occurred within four years of joining the airline, (2) upon conception of a
child, and (3) upon reaching the age of thirty-five, unless granted a special extension up to the

88

Kannabiran, supra note 25, at 90.
See, e.g., Kerala v. Thomas, (1976) 2 S.C.C. 310 (India) (permitting the government of the state of Kerala to make
special exceptions, other than reservations, for members of the scheduled castes and tribes in government
employment); see also Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477 (affirming the state’s authority to
make provision, in the form of reservations, concessions or exceptions, for the advancement of the backward
classes, provided that backwardness was not determined solely on the basis of caste).
90
See Thomas, supra note 89, at 513 (“The principle of proportionate equality is attained only when equals are
treated equally and unequals are treated unequally.”).
91
See, eg., Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, 1989 AIR 38 (1988) (requiring no concrete action on
the part of a state to provide for certain destitute pavement merchants evicted by the government from the public
streets on which they plied their wares, despite the Court’s recognition that the hawkers were forced by their
circumstances to carry out business on public pavements).
92
Air India v. Nergesh Meerza, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1829 (India).
93
Id.
89

15

age of forty-five.94 In a convoluted opinion that mixed substantive and formal equality
provisions, the Court upheld certain parts of the policy while striking others. In upholding the
clause that required airhostesses to remain unmarried for four years after joining the airline, the
Court reasoned that the provision was in the interests of the employees.95 In the Court’s view, the
requirement would ensure that airhostesses would only enter into the institution of marriage
physically prepared and with the necessary maturity.96 The Court also upheld the differential
retirement ages for airhostesses and pursers, observing in this regard that the two cadres were
separate classes and therefore did not have to be governed by the same terms of employment.97
It stipulated, however, that extensions of employment up to the age of forty-five were to be
granted on a non-discretionary basis provided that the airhostess in question was in good health,
in order to ensure non-discrimination within the airhostess cadre.98 Finally, the Court struck
down the prohibition on pregnancy, remarking that “divert[ing] the ordinary course of human
nature” in this manner was “an open insult to Indian womanhood—the most sacrosanct and
cherished institution.”99 It wholeheartedly sanctioned, however, a proffered alternative version
of the provision that mandated retirement upon an airhostess’ third pregnancy.100
Upon nearly identical facts, in July 2003, the Supreme Court in Air India Cabin Crew
Association v. Yeshawinee Merchant reversed a Bombay High Court decision mandating nondiscrimination between the male and female cadres, upholding in full its 1989 Nergesh Meerza
decision.101 In delivering its opinion, the Court noted that some of the airhostesses were members
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of the union that had negotiated these disparate terms.102 It reflected, with regard to the earlier
retirement age mandated for airhostesses, that “[t]here is nothing objectionable for airhostesses
to wish for a peaceful and tension-free life at home with their families in the middle age and
avoid remaining away for long durations on international flights,” apparently overlooking the
fact that the airhostesses challenging the policy were not so inclined.103 Perhaps most
surprisingly, the Court, viewing the union’s negotiation of the conditions of retirement as
evidence that the airhostesses considered this a provision “favourable to them,” categorized this
provision as the type of “special treatment” authorized by the Equal Remuneration Act to be
performed in favor of women.104 In other words, the Court interpreted the substantive equality
exception to the Equal Remuneration Act, which permits the government to take special action
for the benefit of women, to allow Air India to mandate that its female employees retire at an
earlier age than similarly situated males.
Nergesh Meerza is widely cited by scholars as a thorn in the Supreme Court’s substantive
equality jurisprudence.105 In interpreting the equality provisions of the Constitution, the Court
employed myopic and circular reasoning that essentially upheld continuing discriminatory
treatment based on a superficial division of men and women into different classes which
102
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assigned men arguably preferable terms of employment.106 The results fell far short of the
egalitarian objectives expressed by the framers of the Constitution.
Consistent with a substantive approach to equality, the Nergesh Meerza and Yeshawinee
Merchant Courts viewed themselves to be acting for the particular benefit of female workers,
whom they perceived as being differently situated and having different priorities from their male
coworkers. The Court believed that in permitting airhostesses to negotiate terms purportedly
favorable to them, it was acting in their best interests.107 This approach to substantive equality
ultimately failed because it assumed, on the basis of regressive gendered norms, that male and
female employees had different priorities.108 It imposed what it believed to be substantive
equality of opportunity to negotiate terms of employment without inquiring into the actual
bargaining power of women within the union or the ways in which the gendered context in which
they were operating limited their ability to negotiate better terms for themselves.109
Compounding the problem was the Court’s myopic application of formal equality. It
essentially viewed the airline’s classification of male and female employees into separate cadres,
with attendant disparate terms of employment, as evidence of these two cadres being separate
classes not similarly situated for the purposes of formal equality analysis. Although the Court
applied formal equality within the class of airhostesses, to strike down the discretionary aspect of
106
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extensions beyond the default age of retirement, it refused to mandate that the airline offer the
same terms of employment to male and female employees. This was so despite the Court’s
acknowledgment of a substantial similarity in the types of work performed by the airhostesses
and the pursers.110 In accepting the airline’s superficial distinction between the two classes based
on discriminatory terms of employment and the purportedly different interests and priorities of
the two groups, and in refusing to require equal conditions for similar work, as required by the
terms of the Equal Remuneration Act, the Court intermingled substantive and formal equality in
such a manner as to render both doctrines ineffective.
5. SOLUTIONS
5.1. Legislative Solutions
The deeply ingrained and multilayered structural inequalities that underlie Indian society
necessitate the adoption of a substantive approach to equality that takes into account the fact that
actors differently situated may not benefit in the same ways from a uniform application of
equality principles.111 However, India’s existing approach to substantive equality has yielded
unpredictable and unsatisfactory results in part because the existing framework is limited in its
reach and flawed in its approach to employment discrimination.
The limitations of a primarily reservation-based system and the inadequacy of the current
statutory scheme to account for various types of discrimination against a full range of
disadvantaged groups significantly qualify the ability of the current framework to address the
problem of employment discrimination.112 One possible solution that has been increasingly
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proposed in recent years has been to extend reservations to the private sector.113 However, this
step would have to be carefully considered in view of the significant opposition such proposals
have met in the private sector.114 India is a developing country, with strong reasons to encourage
a competitive business environment, and the possible detrimental effects of such legislation on
industry would therefore need to be fully explored.
A less drastic solution might involve the legislation of a comprehensive umbrella
employment statute,115 which would guarantee freedom from discrimination in the workplace to
a full range of disadvantaged minorities. Such a statute would articulate the types of adverse
actions that would qualify as illegal employment discrimination and the remedies to be made
available to victims of such discrimination. It might impose a responsibility on private employers
to take reasonable steps to ensure the full participation of minorities in the workplace. Given
existing hierarchies, such a provision would necessarily require that employers make certain
reasonable accommodations to create an environment in which disadvantaged workers would
have the opportunity to function on par with their more privileged coworkers. An employment
discrimination statute would provide guidelines for the Courts in interpreting state guarantees of
equality, and would extend equality protections to the private and agricultural sectors. It might
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incorporate a presumption in favor of disadvantaged employees in order to ease the extremely
heavy burden of litigation.116
The existing employment discrimination framework would be further enhanced through
the provision of positive incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, and new business licenses to
encourage employers to hire more workers from disadvantaged groups and to take extraordinary
steps to ensure substantive equality in the workplace. Employers should be encouraged to
educate themselves and their employees about their rights and responsibilities under the law.
Positive incentives would likely be met with a greater level of acceptance within the private
sector than are more drastic remedies such as private-sector reservations. They would carry the
additional benefit of ensuring a happier and better-trained workforce, as employers would be
incentivized to provide such accommodations as additional training for workers from
disadvantaged groups.
The limitations of the existing framework might be further addressed through the
provision of civil remedies in addition to the existing criminal penalties for violations of
employment law. The Equal Remuneration Act is a criminal statute, which prescribes fines and
imprisonment for illegal discrimination.117 Although the criminal law places the responsibility of
prosecuting offenses on the state, and thereby alleviates the burden of litigation on victims of
employment discrimination who may have limited financial resources, the absence of damages
may disincentivize the pursuit of judicial remedies. Concomitantly, the relatively minimal
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penalties associated with infractions fail to deter employers from engaging in discrimination.118
Widespread corruption among labor inspectors and the fact that the inspectors are overworked
and underpaid result in failure to adequately prioritize women’s interests.119 These obstacles
deter prospective complainants from asserting their rights under the Act. The provision of a civil
cause of action may bridge this gap by providing incentives for victims to seek judicial recourse
and by ensuring that, at least in some cases, those pursuing judicial remedies will have a vested
interest in the outcome. High-profile employment litigation, with significant damages at stake,
may act as a general deterrent to employers who might otherwise discriminate with impunity.
To ensure adequate protection for complainants with limited means, the Indian
government should explore possible incentives to encourage public interest organizations and
other entities to help provide adequate legal representation.120 Members of disadvantaged groups
are often unaware of their rights, and thus cannot take advantage of the protections afforded them
under the law.121 An agency that could work in tandem with the Courts and would have the
power to oversee, investigate and litigate employment disputes would help fill this gap.122 Such
an agency would presumably have the resources to effectively issue concrete guidelines that
would help employers remain within the bounds of the law and would assist the Courts in
reaching informed judgments.123 It would also have the power to oversee the actions of labor
inspectors and to address allegations of corruption and misconduct within their ranks.
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A more comprehensive framework, which would flesh out and expand the existing
protections, would help ensure robust substantive equality in the realm of employment
discrimination law. However, given the failure of the legislature thus far to fulfill its part in
upholding substantive equality aside from the system of reservations, the judiciary may be called
upon to continue to take an active role in paving the path to fuller minority rights.
5.2. Judicial Solutions
The fact that the legislature has been relatively reluctant to take bold steps, other than in
the form of reservations, to protect disadvantaged minorities from discrimination in employment,
has meant that the judiciary has taken a more active role in upholding the rights of the
underprivileged.124 Some of the judiciary’s actions have been problematic, but in the overall
analysis, it has stepped in to fill the vacuum created by the legislature’s inaction.125 Although
structural solutions are more properly the province of the legislature, which has the resources and
temporal bandwidth to enact effective policies, in the current circumstances, it may continue to
fall to the judiciary to take the necessary steps to prod the legislature into fulfilling its part in
upholding substantive equality.126
Vishaka opens up a means by which the judiciary may be able to provide interim
solutions to the deep-rooted structural inequalities in India.127 In Vishaka, the Court issued sexual
harassment guidelines that were to be binding upon employers until the legislature enacted a
comprehensive sexual harassment law.128 Following the decision in Vishaka, the Parliament
introduced a sexual harassment bill that publicly acknowledged the Court’s role in helping to
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bring this matter to the notice of the legislature.129 Although, as was observed by the Court itself,
judicially imposed corrective measures may not be an ideal solution, they may in some measure
alleviate the worst of the problems that exist in the employment sphere.130 Such action on the
part of the Court may also play a useful role in prodding the legislature into action.131 The
legislature has often found it expedient to let the Courts take the first step in addressing divisive
matters that have the power to backfire against legislators, who are directly accountable to the
people.132 Whatever one may think of the legislature relinquishing its obligations in this manner,
it might quite possibly be more willing to act when the Court has already confronted divisive
issues in the first instance.
In its interpretation of the state’s guarantees of equality, the judiciary should strive for a
richer vision of substantive equality free from the regressive effects of traditional norms.
Substantive equality as a matter of principle recognizes that in an intensely hierarchical social
context, members of disadvantaged groups are not similarly situated to members of more
privileged groups such that formal equality would provide meaningful protection. When there is
a significant disparity in the social standing of individuals, a neutral application of laws and
policies will operate to the disadvantage of subjugated groups. However, for substantive equality
to be meaningful, it cannot rely on the very stereotypical norms that underlie existing social
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classifications.133 Judicial legitimization of regressive stereotypes has the effect of reinforcing
social hierarchies that serve to devalue certain people at the expense of others.134
Nergesh Meerza and Yeshawinee Merchant demonstrate that the intermingling of
substantive and formal equality without regard to the ways in which hierarchical norms define
the social position and expectations of members of disadvantaged groups exacerbates existing
structural inequality. A strict application of formal equality, which would have invalidated the
classification between pursers and airhostesses, may have produced more palatable results in
these cases; however, it has been observed that formal equality often works to the disadvantage
of subordinated groups in intensely hierarchical contexts.135
To adequately account for the differences in social standing and access to opportunity
between privileged and underprivileged groups, the judiciary should as a matter of general
practice first look at cases through the lens of a substantive equality approach designed to
dismantle those factors that operate to perpetuate the subordination of the disadvantaged. Formal
equality should be applied only as a secondary approach, upon establishing that the relevant
parties are in fact meaningfully similarly situated such that application of formal equality will not
merely overlook existing structures of subordination.
A more effective approach to substantive equality in Nergesh Meerza and Yeshawinee
Merchant would have examined more closely the ways in which the collective bargaining
process operates to the disadvantage of the airhostesses. Such factors as the relative bargaining
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power of the airhostesses within the union and the possibility that the same gendered
expectations that originally led Air India to create separate male and female cadres might impose
limitations on the airhostesses’ ability to meaningfully negotiate would be relevant to this
inquiry.136
Formal equality should be limited to cases where the relevant parties are employed in
similar positions and are similarly situated in terms of their relative advantage or disadvantage.
In a hierarchical employment context in which women and members of the scheduled and
backward classes are routinely assigned subordinate positions and inferior terms of employment,
it may well be that members of these groups are not similarly situated relative to more
advantaged employees such that application of formal equality would yield satisfactory results.
6. CONCLUSION
India’s approach to substantive equality has only been modestly successful in alleviating
the deep-seated structural problems that facilitate discrimination in employment. The existing
system addresses only isolated aspects of the problem because it primarily rests on a system of
quotas that pertain only to the public sector and because it does not incorporate a comprehensive
statutory scheme that addresses intended and unintended discrimination in its various forms and
against a full range of disadvantaged groups.
The legislature’s failure to take decisive action to address discrimination in the workplace
has exacerbated the problem. The employment discrimination framework remains extremely
fractured, and the rights of the scheduled and backward castes and women are neglected. This
inaction has forced the judiciary to take on an extremely activist posture to protect the rights of

136

For an analysis of the inadequate consideration given by trade unions to the interests of women and other
disadvantaged groups, see Hensman, supra note 109.

26

the disadvantaged, a circumstance which could prove problematic in certain situations.137
However, in the absence of effective legislative policy, the judiciary should continue to further
the cause of substantive equality in the manner employed in Vishaka.138 This kind of activism on
the part of the Court may provide interim relief and serve the purpose of prodding the legislature
into fulfilling its part in upholding substantive quality.
In interpreting the state’s guarantees of equality, the judiciary should apply a primarily
substantive approach free from the regressive effects of traditional values and norms. Formal
equality should be applied as a secondary framework, after establishing that the relevant parties
are similarly situated in terms of their levels of (dis)advantage, such that the application of
formal equality principles will not perpetuate existing social hierarchies. A more robust
substantive equality of opportunity will, it is to be hoped, be a step towards eradicating the
structures of subordination that operate as barriers to advancement in all spheres of life.
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